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TERMINATION OF THE STAY FOR SUCCESSIVE FILERS:
INTERPRETING § 362(C)(3)
INTRODUCTION
In bankruptcy, the automatic stay thwarts the attempts of eager creditors to
collect their debts, offering debtors in bankruptcy much-needed breathing
space and providing for the most equitable distribution of estate property. It is
no surprise that debtors remain eager to take advantage of the stay’s vast
protection, and for some time, repeated filings merely to access the stay were a
major problem in this country.1 Congress responded by enacting
§ 362(c)(3)(A) of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”).2 Section 362(c)(3)(A) mandates that the automatic
stay terminate, “with respect to the debtor,” thirty days after the petition is filed
if the debtor has had a prior case dismissed within one year of filing.3
A split of authority currently exists regarding the proper interpretation of
this provision of the Bankruptcy Code.4 The majority of courts hold that when
a debtor has had a prior case dismissed within one year of filing, the automatic
stay terminates thirty days after the second petition is filed as to the debtor and
the debtor’s property only.5 The stay continues to protect the property of the
estate.6 Alternatively, the minority of courts hold that under such
circumstances, the stay terminates in its entirety.7 Underlying this debate is an
often unrecognized discrepancy regarding the proper method by which the
changes that BAPCPA made are analyzed. Though principles of statutory
interpretation are generally not the express focus of the courts’ consideration of
§ 362(c)(3)(A), the divergent methods of interpretation adopted by the courts
on either side of the debate explain their disparate outcomes.
1 See Laura B. Bartell, Staying the Serial Filer—Interpreting the New Exploding Stay Provisions of
§ 362(c)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 201, 202 (2008).
2 In re Daniel, 404 B.R. 318, 329 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009).
3 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) (2006).
4 See, e.g., Reswick v. Reswick (In re Reswick), 446 B.R. 362, 365–66 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011); Holcomb
v. Hardeman (In re Holcomb), 380 B.R. 813, 816 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008); Jumpp v. Chase Home Fin., LLC
(In re Jumpp), 356 B.R. 789, 796–97 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006); In re Jones, 339 B.R. 360, 363–65 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 2006).
5 See, e.g., Holcomb, 380 B.R. at 816; Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 796–97; Jones, 339 B.R. at 365.
6 See, e.g., Holcomb, 380 B.R. at 815–16; Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 796–97; Jones, 339 B.R. at 365.
7 Reswick, 446 B.R. at 366.
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The resulting split of authority stems largely from the lack of a clearly
articulated Supreme Court–endorsed framework of statutory interpretation.
Rather than providing lower courts with clear direction of the steps to be taken
when analyzing congressional text, the Supreme Court has handed down
various rules or “canons” of statutory construction.8 These rules stem from the
specific factual premise of the particular case and may often be vague as to
their intended application to a new set of facts. When applied differently, they
may advise entirely different courses of action. Given the volume and range of
available rules, courts are able to pick and choose those that most support their
position on an issue which inevitably leads to a loss of predictability regarding
the § 362(c)(3)(A) analysis a court will conduct.
The Honorable Thomas F. Waldron, a former United States Bankruptcy
Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, addressed the difficulty of interpreting
BAPCPA in his article Principled Principles of Statutory Interpretation: A
Judicial Perspective After Two Years of BAPCPA.9 Judge Waldron discussed
the need to consider “an entire range of statuory principles” when interpreting
BAPCPA and proposed a coherent framework of analysis. 10
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court should adopt Judge
Waldron’s fully articulated framework of statutory interpretation when
interpreting BAPCPA. An analysis of the split of authority over § 362(c)(3)(A)
demonstrates that the outcome each court ultimately reaches is dictated in large
part by the rules of interpretation it employs. The current “system” of statutory
interpretation, consisting of numerous conflicting Supreme Court rules,
produces decisions that are inconsistent and unpredictable. Judge Waldron’s
approach to statutory interpretation produces a complete framework through
which BAPCPA may be analyzed. Applying Judge Waldron’s approach to the
split of authority over § 362(c)(3)(A) reveals that the better interpretation of
§ 362(c)(3)(A) is that of the majority.
Part I of this Comment provides pertinent background information
regarding the automatic stay, the development of the bankruptcy courts’
equitable powers which enable them to enforce the stay, and the evolution of
§ 362(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. Part II of this Comment discusses precedent
8

See Thomas F. Waldron & Neil M. Berman, Principled Principles of Statutory Interpretation: A
Judicial Perspective After Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195, 209–10, 212 (2007) (“The toolbox
containing established canons of statutory interpretation holds an array of tools, many appearing capable of
completing a given task. The difficult decision is determining which is best suited to yield the correct result.”).
9 Id.
10 See id. at 228.
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regarding statutory interpretation and the absence of a well-articulated
framework of statutory interpretation suited for analyzing BAPCPA. Judge
Waldron’s proposed approach to statutory interpretation is then introduced,
followed by an argument for its adoption. Part III discusses the split of
authority regarding § 362(c)(3)(A) and the courts’ disparate approaches to
statutory interpretation. Part III then offers a critique of each analysis,
revealing the logical holes left by the courts. Part IV applies Judge Waldron’s
fully-articulated framework of statutory interpretation to § 362(c)(3)(A),
demonstrating that the majority has produced the better interpretation.
I. BACKGROUND OF 11 U.S.C. § 362(C)
An understanding of the basics of § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code is crucial
to understanding the current interpretive debate surrounding § 362(c)(3)(A).
This Part describes the automatic stay and the protection it affords a debtor
under § 362, the bankruptcy court’s role as a court of equity, and the purpose
behind the enactment of § 362(c).
A. The Automatic Stay
The filing of a bankruptcy petition creates an estate consisting of “all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case.”11 Once a voluntary, involuntary, or joint bankruptcy petition is filed,
§ 362 of the Bankruptcy Code imposes an immediate stay of creditor action.12
This automatic stay prohibits initiating or continuing an action against the
debtor, enforcing any judgment against the debtor, taking any action to gain
possession of estate property, or taking any action “to create, perfect, or
enforce” any lien securing a prepetition claim.13
Likened to a shield by some courts,14 the automatic stay was enacted as
“one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy
laws.”15 The stay prevents all creditor collection, harassment, and foreclosure
11

11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006).
Id. § 362(a).
13 Id. § 362(a).
14 See, e.g., McMahon ex rel. Winters v. George Mason Bank, 94 F.3d 130, 136 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Section
362 is a shield, not a sword.”); In re Cinnabar 2000 Haircutters, Inc., 20 B.R. 575, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“So
too, the bankruptcy laws should not be a haven for contumacious conduct . . . behind the shield of the
automatic stay.”)
15 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296–97; S. REP. NO. 95989, at 54–55 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5840–41 (“The automatic stay is one of the
12
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action, providing the debtor with valuable breathing space to attempt to emerge
from insolvency.16 The House Report accompanying the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 explained:
The stay is the first part of bankruptcy relief, for it gives the debtor a
respite from the forces that led him to bankruptcy. Frequently, a
consumer debtor is severely harassed by his creditors when he falls
behind in payments on loans. The harassment takes the form of
abusive phone calls at all hours, including at work, threats of court
action, attacks on the debtor’s reputation, and so on. The automatic
stay at the commencement of the case takes the pressure off the
17
debtor.

In addition to the protections afforded the debtor, the stay benefits the
creditors by ensuring an orderly and equitable distribution of any property of
the estate.18 Absent the stay, creditors would have every incentive to act as
quickly and aggressively as possible to collect on their debts.19 Those to collect
first might recover their debts in full, but this would be to the severe detriment
of the remaining creditors.20 The stay attempts to ensure that whatever the
debtor has available to give to his creditors is divided equitably amongst
them.21 The stay also acts to preserve the estate property and ensure maximum
distribution for the creditors.22
Bankruptcy law affords two remedies when a creditor acts in violation of
the automatic stay. First, the courts provide for a civil contempt action by
treating the automatic stay as a court order.23 Courts impose contempt
sanctions for a violation of the stay upon finding from “clear and convincing

fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his
creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to
attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him
into bankruptcy.”).
16 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6296–97; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 54–55, 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5840–41.
17 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 125–26, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6086–87 (footnote omitted).
18 Id. at 340, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6297; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 49, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5835.
19 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6297; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 49, 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5835.
20 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6297; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 49, 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5835.
21 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6297; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 49, 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5835.
22 Kathryn R. Heidt, The Automatic Stay in Environmental Bankruptcies, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 69, 74
(1993).
23 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.12 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2009).
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evidence” that a party “violated a specific and definite court order and that the
party had knowledge of the order sufficient to put him on notice of the
proscribed conduct.”24 The second remedy for an automatic stay violation is
the §362(k) action.25 Under § 362(k) an “individual injured by any willful
violation of a stay provided by [§ 362] shall recover actual damages, including
costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover
punitive damages.”26 These remedies aim to ensure creditors will not overstep
the boundaries put in place by the automatic stay.
B. Bankruptcy Courts as Courts of Equity
The power to issue an automatic stay stems from the bankruptcy courts’
historic role as courts of equity. Early bankruptcy decisions reinforced the
courts’ power to issue injunctions, a traditional form of equitable relief.27 In Ex
parte Christy, the Supreme Court held that, despite the lack of express
statutory authorization under the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, bankruptcy courts
had the power to enjoin secured creditor action against the property of the
debtor.28 The Court recognized that bankruptcy courts have in rem jurisdiction
over the debtor’s assets.29 Therefore, as courts of equity, they may issue
injunctions, a traditional form of equitable relief, to protect the property within
the courts’ jurisdiction.30 In Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust
Company v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, the Supreme
Court reinforced the bankruptcy courts’ injunctive powers, even when the
debtor’s property was in the physical custody of a secured creditor.31
Asserting this injunctive power required that some action be taken “by the
trustee, receiver or debtor” and “this relief was hardly sufficient when a large

24

Wagner v. Ivory (In re Wagner), 74 B.R. 898, 902 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (2006).
26 Id.
27 Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory
Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 7 n.34 (2006).
28 COLLIER, supra note 23 ¶ 362.LH; see Ex parte Christy, 44 U.S. 292, 312 (1844).
29 COLLIER, supra note 23 ¶ 362.LH.
30 See Christy, 44 U.S. at 312 (“[I]t is manifest that the purposes so essential to the just operation of the
bankrupt [sic] system, could scarcely be accomplished; except by clothing the courts of the United States
sitting in bankruptcy with the most ample powers and jurisdiction to accomplish them; and it would be a
matter of extreme surprise if, when Congress had thus required the end, they should at the same time have
withheld the means by which alone it could be successfully reached.”); COLLIER, supra note 23 ¶ 362.LH.
31 COLLIER, supra note 23 ¶ 362.LH; see Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry.
Co., 294 U.S. 648 (1935).
25
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corporate enterprise required injunctive relief in myriad situations.”32
Logistical issues with respect to providing creditors proper notice arose from
allowing the seeker of injunctive relief to come into court on its own accord.33
The legislative solution was to enact the current self-executing stay, which
automatically takes effect upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition.34
The automatic nature of the stay gives filers immediate access to its
powerful protection and it is quite obvious why debtors are so eager to take
advantage of the stay. Freedom from harassing creditors, the ability to retain
one’s assets, and the chance to reorganize a failing business are available
immediately upon filing.35 Not surprisingly, some debtors began to take
advantage of the stay’s protection by continuously refiling a bankruptcy
petition each time their previous case was dismissed.36 This indefinitely
prevented creditor action to collect.37 Present-day § 362(c)(3)(A) results from
congressional response in 1978 to abuse of the stay through serial filings and
subsequent legislative reform.38
C. Section 362(c)
Section 362(c) was enacted with BAPCPA in 2005.39 It has undergone
significant modification in response to continued abuse by serial filers, as
documented by the National Bankruptcy Review Commission.40 This section
discusses its evolution, and describes the modern version of Section 362.
In 1984, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to withhold imposition of
the automatic stay from a debtor who had a prior case dismissed in the
preceding 180 days under certain circumstances.41 Despite the legislature’s

32

COLLIER, supra note 23 ¶ 362.LH.
Id.
34 Id.
35 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006); see also Bartell, supra note 1, at 202 (“The advantage of this automatic
stay to a debtor is clear: all creditor collection action (with limited exceptions) is prohibited, and any such
action in violation of the stay is not only legally ineffective but may be punishable by an award of damages or
as contempt.”)
36 Bartell, supra note 1, at 202.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 202–03.
39 Id. at 201.
40 See infra text accompanying notes 44–53.
41 Bartell, supra note 1, at 202 n.14 (stating that 11 U.S.C. § 109(g) renders “the debtor ineligible if the
prior case was ‘dismissed by the court for willful failure of the debtor to abide by orders of the court, or to
appear before the court in proper prosecution of the case; or . . . the debtor requested and obtained the
33
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attempt at reform, some courts continued to impose the automatic stay for
filers that were ineligible according to the terms of the amendment.42 In
addition to judicial noncompliance, the amendment itself was insufficient to
punish all serial filers.43 For example, the stay continued to benefit debtors
whose prior case had been dismissed earlier than the preceding 180 days or for
reasons outside those expressly included in the 1984 amendment.44
Congress formed the National Bankruptcy Review Commission in 1994, in
part to investigate and solve the issue of abuse by successive filers.45 The
Commission determined that abuse of the stay by successive filings was
particularly problematic among chapter 13 filers.46 In its report to Congress,
the Commission discussed this phenomenon, stating that:
Some debtors file for Chapter 13 . . . on the eve of a foreclosure or
eviction for the sole purpose of delaying the state legal process.
When the threat passes, they dismiss their cases, only to file again
when the mortgagee or landlord brings another legal action to seize
control of the property. The ability to file repeatedly for Chapter 13
relief increases a debtor’s leverage in negotiations with creditors. In
regions where this problem is particularly acute, judges have devoted
significant time and resources to developing tools to address this
47
problem.

Alternatively, the Commission acknowledged that many other repeat filers
may not be abusing the system and therefore dramatic changes should be
avoided.48 Ultimately, the Commission recommended to Congress that the
automatic stay should not take effect in certain instances to avoid abuse by
successive filers, stating that:
[F]requent and repetitive access to the tools of bankruptcy should be
discouraged if one trip to the bankruptcy system provides the relief
that Congress intended. Thus, rather than advocating a flat two-year

voluntary dismissal of the case following the filing of a request for relief from the automatic stay provided by
section 362 of this title.’”).
42 Id. at 203.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 In re Daniel, 404 B.R. 318, 327 (Bankr. E.D. Ill. 2009); see also Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106, §§ 602–03 (1994).
46 NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, 1, 281 n.731–32 (October
20, 1997), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/reportcont.html.
47 Id.
48 Id. (“The evidence still is not sufficiently conclusive . . . to warrant a drastic change in access when a
more moderate approach would suffice.”).
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ban, the Commission recommends a more moderate change to deter
successive filings. A debtor would not be precluded from filing two
petitions within a six-year time frame. If a debtor sought bankruptcy
relief for the third time in six years, and within six months of the
dismissal or conversion of the second filing, the filing would not
49
trigger an automatic stay.

In 1998, the year following the release of the Commission’s report, the
House Judiciary Committee released its own report titled “The Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1998.”50 This report included Section 121, entitled
“Discouraging Bad Faith Repeat Filings.”51 Section 121 mandated that the
automatic stay terminate “with respect to the debtor” and contained essentially
the same language as modern-day § 362(c)(3)(A).52 The accompanying
committee report stated:
The filing of a bankruptcy case causes the immediate imposition of
an automatic stay, which prevents creditors from pursuing action
against debtors and their property. In light of this some debtors file
successive bankruptcy cases to prevent secured creditors from
foreclosing on their collateral.
Section 121 remedies this problem by terminating the automatic stay
in cases filed by an individual debtor under chapters 7, 11 and 13 if
his or her prior case was dismissed within the preceding year. In the
subsequently filed bankruptcy case, the automatic stay terminates 30
53
days following the filing date of the case.

Also in 1998, the Senate Judiciary Committee issued a report entitled “The
Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998.”54 This report contained § 303,

49
50
51
52

Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 105-540 (1998).
Id. at 80.
As one court has noted:
Section 121 stated: ‘“If a single or joint case is filed by or against an individual debtor under
chapter 7, 11, or 13, and if a single or joint case of that debtor was pending within the previous 1year period but was dismissed, other than a case refiled under a chapter other than chapter 7 after
dismissal under section 707(b) of this title, the stay under subsection (a) with respect to any
action taken with respect to a debt or property securing such debt or with respect to any lease will
terminate with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later case . . . .’”

In re Daniel, 404 B.R. 318, 327–28 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009).
53 Id. at 328.
54 S. REP. NO. 105-253 (1998).
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also providing for the termination of the automatic stay with respect to the
debtor and language essentially identical to modern-day § 362(c)(3)(A).55
The current version of § 362(c)(3)(A) was enacted in 2005 with
BAPCPA.56 Only a report of the House Judiciary Committee accompanied
BAPCPA.57 The report read:
Section 302 of the Act amends section 362(c) of the Bankruptcy
Code to terminate the automatic stay within 30 days in a chapter 7,
11, or 13 case filed by or against an individual if such individual was
a debtor in a previously dismissed case pending within the preceding
58
one-year period.

Notably, the report does not include the phrase, “with respect to the
debtor,” that is found in the provision itself.59 However, in all other aspects it is
quite similar to the language of § 362(c)(3)(A).60
The language of the modern version of § 362(c)(3) reads:
[I]f a single or joint case is filed by or against debtor who is an
individual in a case under chapter 7, 11, or 13, and if a single or joint
case of the debtor was pending within the preceding 1-year period but
was dismissed, other than a case refiled under a chapter other than
61
chapter 7 after dismissal under § 707(b)-

Subsection (A) further states:
The stay under subsection (a) with respect to any action taken with
respect to a debt or property securing such debt or with respect to any

55

As discussed by the court in Daniel, § 303 provided that:
[T]he stay under subsection (a) with respect to any action taken with respect to a debt or property
securing such debt or with respect to any lease shall terminate with respect to the debtor on the
30th day after the filing of the later case if—(A) a single or joint case is filed by or against an
individual debtor under chapter 7, 11, or 13; and (B) a single or joint case of that debtor (other
than a case refiled under a chapter other than chapter 7 after dismissal under section 707(b)) was
pending during the preceding year but was dismissed.

Daniel, 404 B.R. at 328.
56 The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23
(2005).
57 Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 217.
58 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(1), at 69 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 138.
59 See generally id. at 69, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 138.
60 Compare id. at 69, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 138, with 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) (2006).
61 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A).
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lease shall terminate with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after
62
the filing of the later case[.]

A split of authority has emerged over the proper interpretation of the phrase
“with respect to the debtor.”63 The majority of courts have held that the phrase,
when considered in the context of the provision as a whole, has an
unambiguous plain meaning.64 That meaning is to qualify the extent of the
automatic stay’s termination.65 These courts read “with respect to the debtor”
as limiting the termination of the automatic stay to the debtor and the debtor’s
property, leaving the stay intact as to the property of the estate.66
Alternatively, the minority view rejects this interpretation and holds that
the stay terminates in its entirety.67 The minority’s contextual analysis,
restricted primarily to § 362(c)(3), concludes that the phrase serves to clarify
that in a joint filing by a married couple the stay only terminates with respect
to the spouse with the previously dismissed case.68 The minority draws much
of the support for its interpretation from the limited legislative history of
BAPCPA.69
II. STATUTORY INTERPETATION
Words are certainly not crystals, as Mr. Justice Holmes has wisely
and properly warned us, but they are after all not portmanteaus. We
can not quite put anything we like into them. And we may not
disregard them in statutes. The real question in statutory
70
interpretation is just what we shall do with them.

A statute has been described as a “determinable,” in the sense that “it is a
statement which involves a number of possible events or individualizations,
any one of which would be correctly described by that statement.”71 Put
another way, statutes are drafted by representatives seeking to formulate a rule
62

Id. § 362(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Reswick v. Reswick (In re Reswick), 446 B.R. 362, 365–66 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011); Holcomb
v. Hardeman (In re Holcomb), 380 B.R. 813 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008); Jumpp v. Chase Home Fin., LLC (In re
Jumpp), 356 B.R. 789 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006). See generally In re Jones, 339 B.R. 360 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006).
64 See, e.g., Holcomb, 380 B.R. at 815; Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 793; Jones, 339 B.R. at 363.
65 See, e.g., Holcomb, 380 B.R. at 815; Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 793; Jones, 339 B.R. at 363.
66 See, e.g., Holcomb, 380 B.R. at 815; Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 793; Jones, 339 B.R. at 363.
67 Reswick, 446 B.R. at 366.
68 Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3).
69 See Reswick, 446 B.R. at 371–72.
70 Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 866 (1930).
71 Id.at 868.
63
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that deals appropriately with varying factual situations.72 Ideally, legislators
consider the full range of circumstances to which a statute may potentially be
applied and draft the language to produce the desired result in each instance.
Courts engaging in statutory interpretation focus on deciphering “the intent
of the legislator[s]” enacting the statute, as it would exist for the specific
factual circumstances at hand.73 During litigation, the necessary inquiries then
become whether the question posed by the relevant factual circumstances is
one of these “events or individualizations” that the enacting legislators
considered, and if so, what outcome was intended. 74
Traditionally, two competing jurisprudential theories of statutory
interpretation have provided the basis for interpreting statutory law, including
the Bankruptcy Code.75 These theories are widely known as purposivism and
textualism.76 The Supreme Court has often drawn on the various logical
underpinnings of these theories when discussing statutory interpretation.77
However, what remains lacking is an overarching method of statutory
interpretation that properly organizes for the courts the steps to be taken in an
analysis of statutory language. As a possible solution, the Honorable Thomas
F. Waldron, a former United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Southern District
of Ohio, proposed an approach to interpreting BAPCPA in 2007.78 Judge
Waldron presented a well-articulated approach to statutory analysis, organized
into the specific steps a court should take in analyzing BAPCPA.79
A. Purposivism
The following assumptions have traditionally been regarded as the
foundation of purposivism.80 Congress passes statutes with a desire to fulfill
some underlying purpose.81 While the text of the statute ordinarily reflects this
purpose, occasionally a particular provision will yield results at odds with

72

Id.
Id. at 869.
74 Id.
75 Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 203.
76 Id. (“The Supreme Court’s decisions involving bankruptcy issues have often been the battleground for
the competing jurisprudential theories denominated purposivism and textualism.”).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 228.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 203–04.
81 Id. at 203.
73
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Congress’s intended purpose.82 This occasional discrepancy, between
Congress’s intended application and a particular court’s application, is
inevitable due to the various “constraints” on legislators. 83 These constraints
include “limited resources, bounded foresight, and inexact human language.”84
Where a given piece of statutory text is at odds with the intended statutory
purpose, judges should make every effort to determine congressional intent and
“enforce Congress’s commands as accurately as possible.”85 Purposivism
focuses on “what it is the legislature ultimately sought to accomplish.”86 The
federal courts are to act as Congress’s “faithful agents” and enforce the “spirit”
of a statute, rather than consider themselves bound by the text.87
Purposivism was once the predominant theory subscribed to by the United
States courts.88 The Supreme Court decision known for articulating this theory
of statutory interpretation, Holy Trinity Church v. United States, introduced the
ways a court might discern the legislature’s purpose.89
We find, therefore, that the title of the act, the evil which was
intended to be remedied, the circumstances surrounding the appeal to
congress, the reports of the committee of each house, all concur in
affirming that the intent of congress was simply to stay the influx of
90
this cheap, unskilled labor.

Many of these considerations continue to form modern courts’ legislative
history analyses.91 In In re Reswick, discussed in Part III of this Comment, the
court relied on similar considerations: the title of the BAPCPA legislation,
which added § 362(c)(3) to the Bankruptcy Code (“the title of the act”); the
problematic abuse of the automatic stay by “serial filers” (“the evil which was
intended to be remedied”); and the accompanying House Judiciary Committee
82

Id.
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 71–72 (2006)
(footnote omitted).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 72 (“Accordingly, the Court long assumed that when the clear import of a statute’s text deviated
sharply from its purpose, (1) Congress must have expressed its true intentions imprecisely, and (2) a judicial
faithful agent could properly adjust the enacted text to capture what Congress would have intended had it
expressly confronted the apparent mismatch between text and purpose.” (footnote omitted)).
86 EVA H. HANKS, MICHAEL E. HERZ & STEVEN S. NEMERSON, ELEMENTS OF LAW 255 (1994).
87 See Manning, supra note 83, at 71–72.
88 Id. at 71 (“For a not inconsiderable part of our history, the Supreme Court held that the ‘letter’ (text) of
a statute must yield to its ‘spirit’ (purpose) when the two conflicted.”).
89 Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465 (1892).
90 Id.
91 See Reswick v. Reswick (In re Reswick), 446 B.R. 362, 371–72 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011).
83
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Report (“the reports of the committee of each house”); to conduct its analysis
of legislative history.92
Though purposivism was once fully endorsed by the Supreme Court, the
theory came under heavy criticism at the end of the twentieth century.93
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, Chief
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, shaped the
“new textualist” movement by criticizing purposivism on two bases.94 First,
they argued that only the text of the statute has survived the constitutionally
mandated hurdles a bill must pass to become law, namely bicameralism and
presentment.95 New texualists believe that overreliance on sources other than
the text itself dishonor these procedural safeguards built into the Constitution.96
Second, the new textualists asserted that the idea that a multi-member body
passes a statute with a single intent is “fanciful.”97 In reality, many of the
issues which judges are meant to rule on likely never passed through the minds
of most of the legislators who voted to enact the statute.98
B. Textualism
Textualism, like purposivism, purports to determine congressional intent;
however, it does so through an analysis of the words that Congress selected to
convey that intent.99 In Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., the Supreme Court stated what has now become an axiom of
statutory interpretation, “the starting point for interpreting a statute is the
language of the statute itself.”100 Textualists’ primary rationale for looking
92

See id.
Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 204.
94 Id.; Manning, supra note 83, at 73; see W. VA Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991)
(employing textualist reasoning).
95 Manning, supra note 83, at 73 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?,
66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 445 (1990) (“What distinguishes laws from the results of opinion polls conducted
among legislators is that the laws survived a difficult set of procedural hurdles and either passed by a twothirds vote or obtained the President’s signature.” (emphasis omitted)).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 73–74; see also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (“[T]he quest for the ‘genuine’ legislative intent is probably a wild-goose chase
anyway.”).
98 See Manning, supra note 83, at 74.
99 Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 203.
100 Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); see also Hallstrom
v. Tillamook Cnty., 493 U.S. 20, 25 (1989) (“As we have repeatedly noted, ‘the starting point for interpreting a
statute is the language of the statute itself.’”) (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 447 U.S. at 108); Atwell
v. KW Plastics Recycling Div., 173 F.Supp. 2d 1213, 1217 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (“It is axiomatic that ‘the starting
93
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solely to the text stems from the underlying concern that sources other than the
text are invalid and harmful to determining the proper interpretation of a
statute.101 Professor Michael Herz noted:
First, only the statutory text undergoes [the] full [constitutionally
required] procedures for lawmaking, including a vote by both houses
and presentment to the President . . . legislative history does not
indicate congressional intent because, as a rule, it is written by staff
members, under the direction of lobbyists, and goes unread by the
legislators themselves. Second, a morsel of legislative history can
usually be found to support any proposition, making its use redundant
at best and pernicious at worst. Finally, resort to any interpretive
guide other than the statutory text is an opportunity for judges to read
102
their own policy preferences into the statute.

Current Supreme Court precedent has adopted the “plain meaning
approach” as the default rule of statutory interpretation.103 According to this
doctrine, if the courts are able to determine the plain meaning of the statute
from the language of the statute itself, the courts must enforce that meaning.104
The Supreme Court has adopted this approach when interpreting the
Bankruptcy Code.105 In United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, the Supreme
Court interpreted another provision of the Bankruptcy Code and stated “[t]he
plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the rare cases [in
which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at
odds with the intentions of its drafters.”106

point for interpreting a statue is the language of the statute itself.’”) (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n,
447 U.S. at 108);
101 See Michael Herz, Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional Micromanagement: A Potential Collision
in Clean Air Act Interpretation, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 183–84 (1992).
102 HANKS, HERZ & NEMERSON, supra note 86, at 259 (quoting Herz, supra note 101, at 183–84).
103 See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1989) (“[A]s long as the statutory
scheme is coherent and consistent, there generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language
of the statute.”); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“It is elementary that the meaning of a
statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and
if the law is within the constitutional authority of the law-making body which passed it, the sole function of the
courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”); Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“[W]hen the
statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is
not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414, 416 (4th
Cir. 2004) (“It is an axiom of statutory interpretation that the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute
governs, barring exceptional circumstances.”).
104 See Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485; Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534; Schmidt, 388 F.3d at 416.
105 Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 240–41 (“[A]s long as the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent,
there generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of the statute.”).
106 Id. at 242 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Under the plain meaning approach, courts begin by considering whether a
provision is ambiguous.107 The existence of ambiguity in a phrase may be a
point of contention among courts.108 Various semantic canons of construction
exist to assist courts in deciphering a statute’s meaning.109 When a statute
contains a phrase that explicitly includes certain things, a canon known as
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, advises that the phrase impliedly excludes
those things not mentioned.110 Two canons, noscitur a sociis and ejusdem
generis, focus on the position of the phrase or words in question as they relate
to the surrounding text.111 Noscitur a sociis advises that a word is known by its
associates and its meaning may be limited or expanded by the surrounding
language.112 Ejusdem generis proposes that if a list of specific terms is
followed by a more open-ended residual term, that residual term is modified to
a narrower interpretation and meant only to include that within its definition,
which has the same characteristics as the preceding terms.113
While the plain meaning approach is the current default rule of statutory
interpretation, modern bankruptcy courts have tended to blend the principles of
both textualism and purposivism in analyzing BAPCPA.114 Proponents of these
two theories, separated by what source each adheres to as most evident of true
congressional intent, are collaborating and drawing from one another’s bank of
arguments.115 The result is a “more holistic view of statutory interpretation.”116
107 See, e.g., Holcomb v. Hardeman (In re Holcomb), 380 B.R. 813, 816 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008) (“First,
we see no ambiguity in the language of the statute.”); Jumpp v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (In re Jumpp), 356
B.R. 789, 793 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006) (“We begin by considering whether section 362(c)(3)(A) is ambiguous.”).
108 Compare Reswick v. Reswick (In re Reswick), 446 B.R. 362, 370–71 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011)
(determining the phrase “with respect to the debtor” in § 362(c)(3)(A) is ambiguous), with Jumpp, 356 B.R. at
796 (determining the phrase “with respect to the debtor” in § 362(c)(3)(A) is unambiguous).
109 JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 222 (Robert C. Clark
et al. eds., 2010).
110 Id.; see Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing the
expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon and stating that “Congress’ explicit listing of who may sue for
copyright infringement should be understood as an exclusion of others from suing for infringement.”).
111 See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995) (relying on the noscitur a sociis canon to
inform its interpretation of “prospectus” in the statute); Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936)
(describing the ejusdem generic canon).
112 See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 575–76 (discussing the doctrine of noscitur a sociis and ultimately holding
that because “prospectus” appears in a list of other documents of wide dissemination, it only includes
“communications held out to the public at large.”).
113 Gooch, 297 U.S. at 128.
114 Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 205 (“Conventional wisdom has it that textualists emphasize
statutory text and purposivists emphasize statutory purposes. But when one considers how modern textualists
go about identifying textual meaning and how purposivists go about identifying statutory purposes, the
differences between textualism and purposivism begin to fade.”).
115 Id. at 204.
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An example of this collaboration is the modern textualist focus on deriving
intent from a statute’s context, in addition to its language, in the event a
provision’s text is ambiguous.117 For instance, courts will consider surrounding
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code in determining a provision’s meaning.118
The Supreme Court has authorized this sort of consideration, albeit with a
vague set of directions to courts hoping to determine the proper parameters of
their inquiry:
The definition of words in isolation, however, is not necessarily
controlling in statutory construction. A word in a statute may or may
not extend to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities.
Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole
statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and
119
consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis.

From this excerpt, it is not entirely clear what the precise meaning of “not
necessarily controlling” is and what “precedents and authorities” are actually
relevant or proper to “inform the analysis.”120 As will now be discussed, this is
not the only notion which the Supreme Court has left to the lower courts to
decipher.
C. Supreme Court’s Direction Regarding Statutory Analysis
The Supreme Court has not left the lower courts entirely without direction
regarding statutory interpretation.121 However, rather than articulating an
overall framework of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court has handed
down a plethora of rules, which include the following: “Congress says in a
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there;”122
116

Id.
Id. at 205.
118 See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The plainness or ambiguity of
statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language
is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”); Holcomb v. Hardeman (In re Holcomb), 380 B.R.
813, 816 (10th Cir. 2008) (“As observed in Jones, a plain reading of those words [‘with respect to the debtor’]
makes sense and is entirely consistent with other provisions of § 362 and other sections of the Bankruptcy
Code.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)); Reswick v. Reswick (In re Reswick), 446 B.R.
362, 367 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011) (“[R]eading the phrase in context, rather than in isolation, better comports
with principles of statutory construction . . . .”).
119 Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) (emphasis added).
120 See id.
121 See, e.g., Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489
U.S. 235, 240–41 (1989); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v.
Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414, 416 (4th Cir. 2004).
122 Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000).
117
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“[s]urplusage does not always produce ambiguity and our preference for
avoiding surplusage constructions is not absolute;”123 “[a]chieving a better
policy outcome . . . is a task for Congress, not the courts.”124
Lower courts have presumably made faithful attempts to adhere to such
Supreme Court precedent, but their holdings have been inconsistent on many
key issues.125 The lack of clarity surrounding the interpretation of BAPCPA
provisions on these key issues demonstrate the dire need for a more organized
approach to statutory interpretation.126 This is especially evident in bankruptcy
law, just as many commentators predicted it would be given the Bankruptcy
Code’s vague provisions.127 What the lower courts desperately need is an
overarching framework that explains how the various rules provided by the
Supreme Court work together and in what order they should be considered.
D. Difficulty Interpreting § 362(c)
To say that § 362(c) is unpopular with some courts is an understatement.128
The first court to report a decision on the provision called the language of
§ 362(c) “at best, particularly difficult to parse and, at worst, virtually
incoherent.”129 Another court found four distinct plausible interpretations of
§ 362(c)(3)(A).130 In 2006, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina described its reluctance to engage in interpreting
§ 362(c)(3)(A), stating: “Once again, warily, and with pruning shears in hand,
the court re-enters the briar patch that is § 362(c)(3)(A).”131
Judge Waldron noted the problematic unpredictability of the analysis any
given court will undertake in interpreting the BAPCPA provisions:
Although it would be unreasonable to expect complete, or nearly
complete, uniformity in the interpretation of BAPCPA, the stark
differences in how the new law is being interpreted throughout the
nation’s bankruptcy courts have compromised, if not crippled, any
123

Lamie, 540 U.S. at 536.
Hartford Underwriters, 503 U.S. at 13–14.
125 See Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 195–96.
126 See, e.g., id.
127 Id. at 197 (“Due to the readily apparent problems in BAPCPA’s text, this lack of uniformity among
reported decisions of the bankruptcy courts is not surprising and was correctly predicted by many
commentators when BAPCPA was enacted.”).
128 See Bartell, supra note 1, at 227 (citing In re Charles, 332 B.R. 538, 541 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005)).
129 Charles, 332 B.R. at 541.
130 In re Daniel, 404 B.R. 318, 321 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009).
131 In re Jones, 339 B.R. 360, 363 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006).
124
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pretense of predictability in the analysis a court might apply in
132
interpreting its many poorly drafted provisions.

Courts have reached diametrically opposed conclusions on some of the most
basic elements of BAPCPA and the federal bankruptcy system.133 The current
circuit split over the extent to which the automatic stay terminates pursuant to
§ 362(c)(3)(A) is evidence that the unpredictability continues.134
BAPCPA’s inartful drafting is further aggravated by a general absence of
legislative history.135 The statute is the result of years of proposed legislation,
though it was not accompanied by many of the traditional forms of legislative
history upon which courts may rely to interpret statutory text.136 There is no
joint conference committee report or accompanying floor statements, which
are generally made by floor managers and have been considered “persuasive
evidence of congressional intent.”137 There is also no Senate Judiciary
Committee Report preceding BAPCPA.138 There is a House Judiciary
Committee Report, but it merely repeats BAPCPA’s text and provides little
interpretive assistance.139
In the absence of legislative history specific to BAPCPA, courts have
considered the legislative history of the various proposed pieces of legislation
leading up to the enactment of BAPCPA.140 It seems however, that reports and
132
133

Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 196.
Several scholars have noticed this split:
A review of a growing body of bankruptcy court and appellate decisions on issues as basic as a
debtor’s eligibility to file bankruptcy, the applicability of the automatic stay, the rights of secured
vehicle creditors and the calculation of disposable income in chapter 13, demonstrates that the
bankruptcy courts have often reached diametrically opposed legal conclusions.

Id. at 195–96.
134 See, e.g., Reswick v. Reswick (In re Reswick), 446 B.R. 362, 365–66 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011); Holcomb
v. Hardeman (In re Holcomb), 380 B.R. 813, 816 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008); Jumpp v. Chase Home Fin., LLC
(In re Jumpp), 356 B.R. 789, 796–97 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006); Jones, 339 B.R. at 363–65.
135 Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 217.
136 Id. at 216–17 (“It is a matter of record that, despite multiple versions of proposed bankruptcy
legislation that eventually resulted in BAPCPA, beginning with the September 18, 1997 Responsible Borrower
Protection Bankruptcy Act and the Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1997, it was not until 2005 that
Congress passed, and the President signed into law, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005.”).
137 Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 64 n.5 (1990).
138 Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 217.
139 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 69 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 138; Waldron & Berman,
supra note 8, at 217.
140 Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 217 (citing In re Quevedo, 345 B.R. 238, 243–46 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 2006)).
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statements surrounding a predecessor statute cannot offer interpretive guidance
of the same weight as those forms of legislative history surrounding the statute
itself. Considerations and objectives that prompted the predecessor statute may
have lost support prior to the drafting of the revised version. In terms of
BAPCPA legislative history, the House Judiciary Committee Report stands
alone.141
E. Judge Waldron’s Proposed Analysis
Judge Waldron suggests a framework of statutory interpretation that
employs a range of principles to deal with BAPCPA’s difficult language and
limited legislative history.142 His proposed analysis is as follows:
(1) Analyze the text to arrive at a plain meaning or determine the
statute is ambiguous; (2) if the statute is ambiguous, use other canons
of statutory interpretation that are not focused on the text, including
legislative history, if available, to determine the text’s meaning; (3)
after reaching a determination of the text’s meaning, an additional
analysis should be undertaken to determine an articulable
congressional purpose consistent with that determination and, in the
event that such a purpose cannot be demonstrated, the earlier
conclusions should be reconsidered; and (4) an analysis should then
be conducted by examining the doctrines of scrivener’s error,
absurdity, contrary to the drafters’ intention and constitutional
143
avoidance as a last check prior to reaching a final conclusion.

The first step is to conduct a plain meaning analysis.144 Judge Waldron
notes this initial step may require reliance on those specific provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code included by Congress to assist in the interpretation of
BAPCPA.145 These provisions include § 101 – Definitions; § 102 – Rules of
Construction; and § 103 – Applicability of Chapters. 146 Judge Waldron further
advises: “To the extent these specific provisions are not of assistance,
consideration should be given to an examination of specific dictionaries cited
by the Supreme Court in bankruptcy cases to determine the meaning of

141
142
143
144
145
146

See id.
Id. at 228.
Id.
Id. at 229.
Id.
Id.; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 102 (2006).
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words.”147 If at this point a plain meaning is determined, Judge Waldron claims
“no further textual examination is required.”148
Next, he writes “however, as part of this plain meaning process, it is
significant to note that the text at issue exists only as part of a comprehensive
bankruptcy statutory scheme and is properly considered in that context.”149 It
seems Judge Waldron is saying that if a plain meaning is determined from the
words themselves, it is not necessary that courts look to context (“no further
textual examination is required.”).150 However, context is “significant” and,
therefore, when there is still uncertainty, or when an overwhelming amount of
contextual evidence suggests another meaning than that found in the words
alone, the courts should consider context.151 This is in line with the Supreme
Court’s direction in Dolan v. U.S. Postal Service, referenced earlier, stating
that “[i]nterpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole
statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and
consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis.”152 Judge
Waldron qualifies the appropriate context to be considered, stating that “it is
appropriate to consider whether the text at issue appears elsewhere in Title 11,
either in the same exact form, or, sometimes, even more significantly, in a
variation of that form.”153
Next, courts must determine whether ambiguity exists, meaning whether
“more than one principled meaning is permissible.”154 However, ambiguity
does not incorporate interpretations that render apparent grammatical errors,
surplusage, or “unforeseen consequences in connection with one or more
provisions of [the] Title.”155 Judge Waldron argues that “where the text at issue
is found to be ambiguous, principles of statutory interpretation expand the
range of resources available to assist in reaching the appropriate
interpretation.”156 If, however, there is a plain meaning, courts should

147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 229.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Dolan v. U.S. Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006).
Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 229.
Id.
Id. at 229–30.
Id. at 230.
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articulate a congressional purpose consistent with this interpretation as the
Supreme Court has done on occasion.157
As a “final check,” courts should consider four doctrines: scrivener’s error;
absurdity; contrary to the drafters’ intention; and constitutional avoidance.158
The doctrine of scrivener’s error recognizes a court’s power to “correct a
clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the record, or correct an
error in the record arising from oversight or omission.”159 The modern
absurdity doctrine is “linguistic rather than substantive.”160 This means that
courts are to use the doctrine to deal with text that may be incomprehensible or
clearly unfit, rather than to improve the substantive effect of the text or to
make the text more aligned with the court’s interpretation of what the statute is
to accomplish.161 The third doctrine, contrary to the drafters’ intention,
recognizes that “[t]he plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except
in the rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters. In such cases, the
intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls.”162 Finally,
the constitutional avoidance canon maintains that “where an otherwise
acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless
such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”163 The
rationale for this doctrine is that Congress likely did not write a statute to pose
constitutional issues; therefore, if another interpretation is reasonable that does

157
158
159
160
161

Id. (citing Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 539 (2004)).
Id. at 230–31.
United States v. Robinson, 368 F.3d 653, 655 (6th Cir. 2004).
Jaskolski v. Daniels, 427 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2005).
As one court has noted:
In other words, the modern decisions draw a line between poor exposition and benighted
substantive choice; the latter is left alone, because what judges deem a “correction” or “fix” is
from another perspective a deliberate interference with the legislative power to choose what
makes for a good rule. Admit the propriety of “fixing mistakes” and you allow a general power to
identify “mistakes,” which means a privilege to make the real substantive decision. Even when
the statute invites modification, as the “context clause” in some definitions does, judges are
limited to considering the linguistic context rather than trying to “improve” the statute’s
substantive effect.

Id.
162 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (citations omitted) (internal
quotations omitted).
163 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988).
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not raise constitutional issues, it is more likely the latter that Congress
intended.164
It is important to be mindful that these doctrines are meant to serve as
guidance in situations where provisions remain ambiguous and not to afford
courts the power to recreate law.165 These doctrines aid a court in deciphering
the proper meaning of an ambiguous statutory phrase, but should not serve as
the sole foundation for a reading that is not supported by the text or the
purpose.166
F. Adoption of Judge Waldron’s Approach
Judge Waldron’s approach to statutory interpretation is exceedingly fit for
deciphering the Bankruptcy Code, primarily because it appropriately weighs
the competing strengths and weaknesses of each of the traditional methods of
statutory interpretation: purposivism and textualism. The approach properly
places the greatest emphasis on the text: the text is the law. As the new
textualists argued, only the text has survived bicameralism and presentment. 167
Only the text has been voted on by every member of Congress. 168 Therefore,
those wishing to interpret BAPCPA should, first and foremost, follow the
Supreme Court’s well-settled method of considering the text.169 However, if
the text is not clear, non-textual canons of statutory interpretation, such as
legislative history, are used.170
Judge Waldron’s analysis also places proper weight on context, which
while significant, should not overturn an otherwise clear meaning found in a
phrase. A number of courts have criticized BAPCPA, and specifically
§ 362(c)(3), as examples of sloppy legislation.171 Given Congress’s heavy

164

Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005) (describing the doctrine as “resting on the reasonable
presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts.”).
165 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787 (2008) (“We cannot ignore the text and purpose of a
statute in order to save it.”).
166 Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 230–31.
167 HANKS, HERZ & NEMERSON, supra note 86, at 259 (quoting Herz, supra note 101, at 183–84).
168 Id.
169 Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 203 (noting that “the mantra of plain meaning and the focus on
the statutory text that permeates [the Supreme Court’s] current jurisprudence”).
170 Id. at 230 (“In circumstances where the text at issue is found to be ambiguous, principles of statutory
interpretation expand the range of resources available to assist in reaching the appropriate interpretation of the
text at issue. These resources would include, among others, legislative history . . . .”).
171 See, e.g., In re Daniel, 404 B.R. 318, 320 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009); In re Jones, 339 B.R. 360, 363
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006); In re Charles, 332 B.R. 538, 541 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
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workload and the quality of the drafting that emerged, it seems unlikely that
Congress gave serious consideration to every other instance of similar phrasing
throughout the Code when voting on a particular provision. Furthermore,
Congress is a multi-member body. Therefore, even if a few members on the
respective drafting committees did consider context, the argument that many or
most took context into consideration when voting on the amendments is
questionable.172
Judge Waldron’s analysis appropriately places legislative history after the
text. Legislative history is dangerous if given too much weight during statutory
analysis.
Even if the contents of the minds of the legislature were uniform, we
have no means of knowing that content except by the external
utterances or behavior of these hundreds of men, and in almost every
case the only external act is the extremely ambiguous one of
acquiescence, which may be motivated in literally hundreds of ways,
and which by itself indicates little or nothing of the pictures which
173
the statutory descriptions imply.

Conceptualizing Congress as one unit is problematic and rarely can one expect
that all the individual minds of congressional representatives are uniform, even
amongst those who vote the same way.174 Additionally, a vote of yes or no for
a piece of legislation does not inform us as to the individual’s understanding of
what a specific provision’s meaning and application might be; alternate
motives may guide the direction of one’s voting.175 Finally, although a member
of Congress votes for a piece of legislation in one instance, it is unclear how
that member might vote given a new set of facts.176
Ultimately, legislative history is subject to the courts’ unguided
interpretation and can be manipulated, even absent intention by the courts, to
support a range of conclusions.177 Legislative history has not undergone the
172 See Radin, supra note 70, at 870 (“That the intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any real
sense is almost an immediate inference from a statement of the proposition. The chances that of several
hundred [legislators] each will have exactly the same determinate situations in mind ... are infinitesimally
small.”).
173 Id. at 870–71.
174 Id. at 870.
175 See id. at 870–71.
176 See id.
177 Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 215 (“Judicial investigation of legislative history has a tendency
to become, to borrow Judge Leventhal’s memorable phrase, an exercise in ‘looking over a crowd and picking
out your friends.’”) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005)).
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constitutionally required checks of becoming law178 and heavy reliance upon it
may undermine the importance of the text, which is actually the law. As Judge
Waldron wrote, “[r]egardless of how one views the history of BAPCPA,
legislative history cannot be used as a substitute for the statutory text.”179
In addition to these general concerns regarding the validity of legislative
history, BAPCPA presents a particularly precarious environment in which to
rely upon legislative history because of the scarcity of available legislative
history.180 The House Judiciary Committee Report was the only traditionally
recognized source of legislative history accompanying BAPCPA.181 The
language regarding modern-day § 362(c)(3)(A) is nearly identical and
therefore does not offer much interpretive guidance. 182
Finally, Judge Waldron properly places the four doctrines which provide
courts a foundational basis for ignoring the plain meaning of a provision as the
last consideration of his analysis.183 These four doctrines include Scrivener’s
Error, Absurdity, Contrary to the Drafters’ Intention, and Constitutional
Avoidance.184 While the doctrines provide guidance in selecting between two
or more reasonable meanings, they are not meant to serve as the sole basis for
issuing a decision, nor are they meant to empower the judiciary as makers of
law.185 Their placement as the final step of the proposed analysis properly
reflects their intended use.
The split of authority regarding § 362(c)(3)(A) serves as something of a
case study that exemplifies the need for a coherent approach to statutory
interpretation, such as Judge Waldron’s. The diverging views adopted by the
courts, discussed in Part III in detail, stem from their varying approaches to
statutory interpretation. The outcomes reached by the courts depend on which

178

See HANKS, HERZ & NEMERSON, supra note 86, at 259 (citing Herz, supra note 102, at 183–84).
Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 218.
180 Id. at 217; see Jumpp v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (In re Jumpp), 356 B.R. 789, 765 (B.A.P. 1st Cir.
2006) (noting the “sparse legislative history”).
181 Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 217.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 230–31; see also In re Sorrell, 359 B.R. 167, 174 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (recognizing the doctrines of
scrivener’s error, absurdity, and constitutional avoidance as “exceptions” to the requirement that bankruptcy
courts apply “the ordinary meaning of the statutory text.”); In re Am. Home Mortg., Inc., 379 B.R. 503, 515
(Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (referring to the doctrines of scrivener’s error, absurdity, contrary to the drafter’s
intention, and constitutional avoidance as a “‘reality check’ on the meaning of statutory language.”) (citing
Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 230–31).
184 Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 231.
185 Id.
179
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of the various rules of statutory construction they choose, as well as those that
they do not. The majority and minority views will be presented and explored,
followed by an in-depth analysis according to Judge Waldron’s approach.
From a critique of the individual courts’ methods of statutory interpretation, as
well as the application of Judge Waldron’s approach, it is clear that the
majority position is better reasoned.
III. THE SPLIT OF AUTHORITY OVER THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF
§ 362(C)(3)(A)
The debate over the meaning of § 362(c)(3)(A) ultimately focuses on the
meaning of the provision’s language “with respect to the debtor.”186 Two
dominant views have emerged across the circuits.187 The minority of courts
have interpreted the phrase “with respect to the debtor” to clarify as to whom
the stay terminates.188 These courts hold that the phrase is meant to distinguish
between the debtor and the non-debtor spouse in a joint filing.189 The Ninth
Circuit exemplifies the minority approach in its Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s
2011 decision in In re Reswick.190 In contrast, the majority of courts have
interpreted the phrase “with respect to the debtor” as a modification of the
extent to which the automatic stay terminates.191 These courts hold that the stay
terminates only with respect to the debtor and the debtor’s property, leaving
the stay intact as to the property of the estate.192 The majority approach is
exemplified by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the First Circuit’s 2006
decision in In re Jumpp.
The discussion that follows presents the drastically different approaches the
courts in Reswick and Jumpp took to interpret § 362(c)(3)(A). First, the
minority approach is presented and critiqued, followed by a presentation and
critique of the majority approach. The analysis in Jumpp, which led to the

186 See, e.g., Reswick v. Reswick (In re Reswick), 446 B.R. 362, 365–66 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011); Holcomb
v. Hardeman (In re Holcomb), 380 B.R. 813, 816 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008); Jumpp v. Chase Home Fin., LLC
(In re Jumpp), 356 B.R. 789, 796–97 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006); In re Jones, 339 B.R. 360, 363–65 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 2006).
187 See, e.g., Reswick, 446 B.R. at 365–66; Holcomb, 380 B.R. at 816; Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 796–97; Jones,
339 B.R. at 363–65.
188 Reswick, 446 B.R. at 366–67; In re Curry, 362 B.R. 394, 400–01 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007); In re Jupiter,
344 B.R. 754, 759–60 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006).
189 Reswick, 446 B.R. at 369; Curry, 362 B.R. at 401; Jupiter, 344 B.R. at 759.
190 See Jupiter, 344 B.R. at 759.
191 Holcomb, 380 B.R. at 816; Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 797; Jones, 339 B.R. at 365.
192 See, e.g., Holcomb, 380 B.R. at 816; Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 797; Jones, 339 B.R. at 365.
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court’s adoption of the majority interpretation, is much closer to Judge
Waldron’s proposed analysis and presents a more coherent and complete
examination of § 362(c)(3)(A).
A. The Minority’s Interpretation
1. In re Reswick
The debtor in Reswick sought damages for violation of the automatic stay
following his ex-wife’s postpetition garnishment of his wages.193 This debtor
had initially filed a voluntary chapter 13 petition, which the court dismissed for
failure to make payments.194 Two months later the debtor filed a second
voluntary chapter 13 petition, from which this case arose.195 The ex-wife
successfully argued in the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
California that because the second chapter 13 petition was filed within one
year of the earlier case’s dismissal, § 362(c)(3)(A) mandated a termination of
the automatic stay in its entirety.196
The Ninth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed, adopting the
minority view that § 362(c)(3)(A) “terminates the automatic stay in its entirety
on the thirtieth day after the petition date” when a debtor has had a previous
case dismissed within the prior year.197 The Ninth Circuit’s analysis consisted
of a summarization of the majority and minority views, some consideration of
principles of statutory construction supporting the minority view, an adoption
of the minority view, and lastly, a discussion of the legislative history’s
support of the minority view.198
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by acknowledging the split of
authority regarding the proper interpretation of § 362(c)(3)(A).199 The court
introduced each side’s interpretation, noting the disagreement regarding the
presence of any ambiguity in the phrase “with respect to the debtor.”200 The
debtor argued that the phrase “with respect to the debtor” has an unambiguous
meaning, which the court acknowledged to be true when the phrase is read in
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200

Reswick, 446 B.R. at 364.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 373.
Id.
See generally id.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 366–67.
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isolation.201 However, the court refused to consider the phrase in isolation and
proceeded to consider the phrase within the context of § 362(c)(3) as a
whole.202
Because reading the phrase in context, rather than in isolation, better
comports with principles of statutory construction, the minority
interpretation is more persuasive. And while we recognize the desire
to be cautious in designating statutory text as “ambiguous,” we
believe that such a designation is appropriate here. Our interpretation
203
of section 362(c)(3)(A) finds support in the legislative history.

The court went on to consider the placement of the phrase in question,
following the language “with respect to a debt or property securing such debt
or with respect to any lease.”204 The court argued that if the phrase were meant
to clarify that the stay terminates only as to the debtor personally and his nonestate property, as the majority of courts had held, the phrase is “surplusage,”
making § 362(c)(3)(A) “internally inconsistent.”205 Assuming the phrase “with
respect to the debtor” has the meaning assigned to it by the majority, it already
clarifies as to what the stay terminates, and there is no need for the preceding
“with respect to a debt or property securing such debt.”206
The court continued its contextual analysis focusing primarily on the
provision’s introductory language, “if a single or joint case is filed.”207 The
court held that, given this introductory language, the phrase “with respect to
the debtor” is meant to clarify that when a married couple jointly files for
bankruptcy, the stay terminates only “as to a repeat-filing debtor, but not as to
the debtor’s spouse who is not a repeat filer.”208

201

Id. at 367. The Ninth Circuit stated:
When read in isolation, “with respect to the debtor” may appear unambiguous; however, when
read within the context of section 362(c)(3) a provision which begins with the phrase “if a single
or joint case of the debtor . . .” and goes on to discuss the stay of any action taken “with respect
to a debt or property securing debt or with respect to any lease”—the phrase must be examined
more closely to give the full provision meaning.

Id. at 367.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 368.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 369.
208 Id.
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Ultimately, the court found it “appropriate to conclude that the provision is
ambiguous.”209 The court clarified that this was not merely because courts
disagreed on the provision’s meaning or found it to be poorly drafted.210
Rather, the provision was ambiguous because two distinct lines of
interpretation existed and the plain meaning analysis resulted in reading other
language out of the provision.211
The court saw the presence of ambiguity as an invitation to look to
legislative history, which it found to support the view “that the automatic stay
terminates in its entirety 30 days after the petition date for a repeat filer.”212
First, the court noted the “essentially identical language” of the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees’ bankruptcy reform drafts, following the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission’s report, and § 362(c)(3)(A), adopted by
BAPCPA.213 The court also noted the title of the BAPCPA section which
added modern-day § 362(c)(3)(A), “Discouraging Bad Faith Repeat
Filings.”214 Because the minority interpretation terminates the stay in its
entirety, the court found it to be more in line with the BAPCPA section’s title
and more persuasive of an interpretation.215 Furthermore, the court argued that
because § 362(c)(4) prevents the stay from going into effect at all, and does not
differentiate between the debtor, the debtor’s property, or the property of the
estate, “there is no need to make such a distinction.”216
The court briefly mentioned one policy concern: if the automatic stay does
not terminate in its entirety, there is no “meaningful consequence” for the
repeat filer.217 Practically speaking, the court argues there are very few
instances where a creditor would take action directed only at the debtor or his
non-estate property as most of his property is considered part of the estate.218
Congress must have intended for more harsh consequences than those for
which the majority interpretation provides.219

209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219

Id. at 370–71.
Id. at 370.
Id. at 370–71.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 371–72.
Id. at 372.
Id.
Id. at 372–73.
Id. at 373.
Id.
Id.
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The Ninth Circuit ultimately adopted the minority interpretation of
§ 362(c)(3)(A).220 Because § 362(c)(3)(A), when applicable, calls for a
termination of the automatic stay in its entirety, the automatic stay was not in
effect for the debtor or his property when the wage garnishment proceedings
commenced, and therefore there was no violation of the automatic stay.221
2. Critique
The Ninth Circuit seems to prematurely adopt one interpretation over
another, prior to engaging in a full statutory analysis. Rather than starting with
the facts and applying interpretive principles to move towards the proper
interpretation, the court chose its desired end point, worked backwards to
develop its reasoning.222 For example, the Ninth Circuit noted the existence of
a split of authority and that fact that the “two lines of interpretation [were] so
distinct” as support for finding ambiguity.223 This is backwards reasoning in
the sense that in finding ambiguity, the Ninth Circuit relies in part on the fact
that other courts found the phrase ambiguous, rather than first examining the
phrase with an unbiased eye. This sort of backwards reasoning is detrimental to
statutory interpretation and can prevent the development of a full, unbiased
analysis.224 A summary of the existing arguments is certainly appropriate;
however, it seems the Ninth Circuit determined it was going to adopt the
minority viewpoint from the start and was using rules of statutory construction
to support its view, rather than inform it.
The Ninth Circuit also argued that the majority interpretation of “with
respect to the debtor” renders the phrase superfluous because of its placement
after the language “with respect to a debtor or property securing such debt or
with respect to any lease.”225 However, consideration of the language that
precedes both phrases offers a legitimate explanation. Section 362(c)(3)’s
subsection (A) begins with the language “the stay under subsection (a) with
respect to any action taken.”226 Subsection (a) of § 362 lists eight “entities” to
which the stay applies, distinguishing between property of the debtor, the
220

Id.
Id.
222 Id. at 370–71. .
223 Id.
224 Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 231 (“In commencing a statutory interpretation analysis, it is
important to always start with the reasoning and work forward to the result and avoid any process which
begins with the result and works backward to the reasoning.”).
225 Reswick, 446 B.R. at 368.
226 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) (2006).
221
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debtor’s estate, and the property of the estate.227 Congress may have intended
“with respect to a debt or property securing such debt” to clarify what the
modified stay, which is the subject of the provision, actually encompasses.228
Then, the phrase “with respect to the debtor” may clarify that the stay
terminates as to the debtor and the debtor’s property, without that phrase
constituting surplusage.229 The placement of the phrase following the verb
“terminate”230 would seem to further suggest it modifies the extent of
termination, rather than the language “if a single or joint case,” which appears
at the very beginning of the subsection.
Additionally, the court’s argument that the introductory language serves as
evidence of the minority interpretation is subject to criticism that the phrase
“with respect to the debtor” is then superfluous. In a joint filing, the cases are
administered together to ease the judicial process, but the rights of the creditors
are unaffected, and there are still essentially two automatic stays, one
protecting each of the separate estates.231 The provision itself only applies to a
debtor whose single or joint case was “pending within the preceding 1-year
period but was dismissed.”232 Therefore, if the phrase’s sole purpose is to
clarify as to whom the stay terminates, it offers no new meaning to the
provision itself and is superfluous. Courts “must interpret statutes as a whole,
giving effect to each word and making every effort not to interpret a provision
in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent,
meaningless or superfluous.”233
Finally, the court seemed to give extraordinary weight to what is ultimately
a minimal amount of legislative history. The court referenced the “essentially
identical language” of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees’ bankruptcy
reform drafts and § 362(c)(3)(A), adopted by BAPCPA.234 However, the

227 Id. § 362(a); see Jumpp v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (In re Jumpp), 356 B.R. 789, 794 (B.A.P. 1st
Cir. 2006) (noting that § 362(a) lists those actions which are stayed and distinguishes between acts against the
debtor, against the debtor’s property, and against the property of the estate).
228 Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 794 (acknowledging that “the phrase ‘with respect to the debtor’ also speaks the
same language as other subsections that differentiate between the debtor, property of the debtor, and property
of the estate.”).
229 Id.
230 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A).
231 In re Kosenka, 104 B.R. 40, 43 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
232 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3).
233 Boise Cascade Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Dolan
v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006).
234 Reswick v. Reswick (In re Reswick), 446 B.R. 362, 372–73 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011).
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analysis stopped there.235 The court never explained how similar language of
successive pieces of legislation lends interpretive support to one reading over
another.236 Furthermore, the court did not fully explain its argument that the
absence of any differentiation between the debtor, his property, or the property
of the estate in § 362(c)(4) suggests Congress did not intend such
differentiation in § 362(c)(3)(A).237 It would seem to prove the exact opposite:
Because Congress chose to include such language only in § 362(c)(3)(A), logic
would seem to suggest that Congress did intend a different termination of the
automatic stay than that in § 362(c)(4).238
B. The Majority’s Interpretation of §362(c)(3)(A)
1. In re Jumpp
Jumpp was decided in December of 2006 by the United States Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel of the First Circuit, and it exemplifies the majority
interpretation of § 362(c)(3)(A).239 In that case, the debtor filed a chapter 13
petition.240 The debtor previously had a chapter 13 case dismissed in February
of 2006, within the “preceding 1-year period” of § 362(c)(3).241 Chase Home
Finance, LLC held a mortgage on the debtor’s home.242 The debtor filed
various motions seeking in effect to prevent termination of the automatic stay
as to the property of the estate.243 The debtor appealed the lower bankruptcy
court’s denial of her Motion for Determination and Declaratory Judgment as to
Continuation and Existence of the Automatic Stay and her Motion to Reimpose
the Automatic Stay.244 This appeal forced the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of
the First Circuit to venture into a statutory interpretation analysis to determine
whether § 362(c)(3)(A) in fact terminated the automatic stay as to the property
of the estate.245
235

Id. at 372.
See id.
237 See id. at 372–73.
238 Jumpp v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (In re Jumpp), 356 B.R. 789, 795 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006) (“Where
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (citing Keene
Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993))).
239 Jumpp, 356 B.R. 789.
240 Id. at 790.
241 Id. at 790, 792.
242 Id. at 790.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 791.
236
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First, the court considered whether there was any ambiguity present in
§ 362(c)(3)(A).246 Acknowledging the dominance of the plain meaning
approach, the court stated, “[i]f a Bankruptcy Code provision is unambiguous,
the plain language controls, so long as a literal application of the provision
does not produce an absurd result or one that is ‘demonstrably at odds with the
intentions of its drafters.’”247 The court noted that in determining whether
ambiguity was present, it could consider “the language itself, the specific
context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as
a whole.”248 Ultimately, the court found that viewed in isolation, the language
of the phrase “with respect to the debtor” is unambiguous.249 The court quoted:
Section 362(c)(3)(A) as a whole is not free from ambiguity, but the
words, “with respect to the debtor” in that section are entirely plain; a
plain reading of those words make sense and is entirely consistent
with other provisions of § 362 and other sections of the Bankruptcy
Code. Section 362(c)(3)(A) provides that the stay terminates with
250
respect to the debtor.” How could that be any clearer?

Having determined the phrase was unambiguous in isolation, the court
considered the context in which the language appeared, comparing it to other
provisions of § 362.251 The court noted that the preceding § 362(a) clearly
distinguishes between actions against the debtor, actions against the property
of the debtor, and actions against the property of the estate in a number of
instances.252 Likewise, other subsections isolate one or more of these three
categories. The court stated:
[S]ection 362(b)(2)(B) (providing that the automatic stay does not
prevent “the collection of a domestic support obligation from
property that is not property of the estate”), section 362(c)(1)
(providing that “the stay of an act against property of the estate under
subsection (a) of this section continues until such property is no
246

Id. at 793 (“We begin by considering whether section 362(c)(3)(A) is ambiguous.”).
Id. (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241–42 (1989)).
248 Id. (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)).
249 Id.
250 Id. (citing In re Jones, 339 B.R. 360, 363 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006)).
251 Id. at 794.
252 Id. at 794; see Jones, 339 B.R. at 363–64 (“Section 362(a)(1) stays actions or proceedings ‘against the
debtor;’ 11 § 362(a)(2) stays enforcement of a judgment ‘against the debtor or against property of the estate;’
§ 362(a)(3) stays ‘any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate;’
§ 3629(a)(4) stays ‘any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;” § 362(a)(5)
stays ‘any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien’ to the extent it secures a
prepetition claim; and § 362(a)(6) stays ‘any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the
debtor . . . .’”).
247
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longer property of the estate”), and section 362(c)(2) (providing for
the termination of the stay of “any other act” prohibited by
253
§ 362(a)).

The court also mentioned that § 521(a)(6), which was added to the Code under
BAPCPA, distinguishes between types stays and demonstrates that Congress
knew how to write that the stay terminates as to the estate and the debtor.254
Congress likely would have included language similar to § 521(a)(6) had it
intended a similar outcome under § 362(c)(3)(A).255
Next, the court compared the language of § 362(c)(3)(A) to the language of
§ 362(c)(4)(A)(i), noting that the difference suggested a more limited scope of
the stay termination under § 362(c)(3)(A).256 Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i) refers to a
debtor who has had two or more prior cases dismissed within a year, and it
states that “the stay under subsection (a) shall not go into effect upon the filing
of the later case.”257 The Supreme Court stated, “[w]here Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion.’”258 While § 362(c)(3)(A) qualifies its
language terminating the stay with the phrase “with respect to the debtor,”
§ 362(c)(4)(A)(i) merely states the stay shall not go into effect at all, without
any qualification.259 The Jumpp court noted that “Congress could have
removed the stay in its entirety, as it did under § 362(c)(4), by simply deleting
the phrase ‘with respect to the debtor.’”260 The court expressed its serious
doubt that Congress intended the same result despite the very different
language of the two sections.”261
253

Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 794.
Id. at 794–95 (citing In re Pope, 351 B.R. 14, 16 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2006)) (“I feel that in this instance
Congress has demonstrated an awareness of the difference between a stay against property of the estate, and a
stay against the debtor. . . .”). Section 521(a)(6) reads, in part, “If the debtor fails to so act within the 45-day
period referred to in paragraph (6), the stay under section 362(a) is terminated with respect to the personal
property of the estate or of the debtor which is affected.” 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(6) (2006).
255 Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 795.
256 Id.
257 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i) (emphasis added); Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 795.
258 Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (alterations omitted) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
259 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i); see Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 795.
260 Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 795 (citing In re Brandon, 349 B.R. 130, 132 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006)).
261 Id. at 796 (stating that “we are unconvinced that the significant difference in language between the two
sections reveals a Congressional intent to say the very same thing. Rather, the language indicates intent to
impose different penalties upon previous filers based on the number of previous cases [they have had
dismissed]”).
254
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Then, the court stated, “[h]aving found the plain language to be
unambiguous, we turn to whether a literal application of section 362(c)(3)(A)
would produce an absurd result or one that is “demonstrably at odds with the
intention of its drafters.”262 The court did not engage in a legislative history
analysis because “[e]ven if Congressional intent is contained in the sparse
legislative history, general legislative intent cannot overcome specific,
unambiguous statutory language.”263
Recognizing a general need to ensure the interpretation was not an “absurd
result” given Congress’s purpose, the court expressly disagreed with the
minority approach that limiting the termination of the stay to the debtor and his
property would cease to discourage successive filers from abusing the
system.264 Rather, the court here found that this interpretation struck a proper
balance between Congress’s intent to penalize and deter abuse through
successive filings, while still providing protection to creditors.265 The court
considered the deterrence that termination of the stay only as to the debtor,
would provide.266
Given the wording and categorization found in section 362(a),
termination of the stay with respect to the debtor means that: suits
against the debtor can commence or continue postpetition because
section 362(a)(1) is no longer applicable; judgments may be enforced
against the debtor, in spite of section 362(a)(2); collection actions
may proceed against the debtor despite section 362(a)(6); and liens
against the debtor’s property may be created, perfected and enforced
267
regardless of section 362(a)(5).

The availability of these actions to the creditors under the majority
interpretation proved satisfactory deterrence to this court.268 Therefore, the
result of the court’s interpretation was “neither absurd nor demonstrably at
odds with the intention of the drafters” and was proper.269

262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269

Id. (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)).
Id. at 765 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 797 (citing In re Williams, 346 B.R. 361, 367 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006)).
Id. (citing Williams, 346 B.R. at 367).
Id. (citing Williams, 346 B.R. at 367).
Id. at 796.
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2. Critique
The majority remained faithful to a proper plain meaning analysis because
they considered the phrase at issue both in isolation and in the context of the
rest of the Bankruptcy Code. This allowed the court to make an initial
determination regarding the meaning of the provision, relying solely on the
language of the statute itself. The language of the statute has survived
bicameralism and presentment, the constitutionally mandated hurdles a bill
must pass to become law.270 Then, the majority reasoned that given the lack of
any ambiguity in the text, there was no reason to consult legislative history.271
It seems questionable that, given the lively debate that continues to exist
regarding the interpretation of § 362(c)(3)(A), any court could find the phrase
to be clearly unambiguous. Jumpp was decided five years prior to Reswick,272
which may explain the absence of any consideration of the minority approach.
It is likely that at the time of the decision, the minority approach had not yet
been fully developed. However, a present-day analysis would face criticism for
failure to respond to any of the minority’s arguments regarding the ambiguity
of the phrase.
IV. JUDGE WALDRON’S ANALYSIS
The Ninth and First Circuits’ opposing outcomes were reached as a result
of the disparate analyses used; these outcomes further demonstrate the need for
a clearly articulated method of statutory interpretation. The majority’s analysis
was more persuasive and more closely adhered to Judge Waldron’s proposed
framework.273 What follows is a complete analysis of § 362(c)(3)(A) using
Judge Waldron’s approach to statutory interpretation of BAPCPA. This
analysis demonstrates that, while both approaches fall short of a complete
analysis, the majority interpretation is the better reading of § 362(c)(3)(A) and
the court’s analysis in Jumpp is better reasoned in its approach to statutory
interpretation.

270

Manning, supra note 83, at 73 (citing Easterbrook, supra note 95, at 445).
Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 796.
272 Compare Reswick v. Reswick (In re Reswick), 446 B.R. 362, 370–71 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011), with
Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 796.
273 Compare Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 796, with Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 228.
271
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A. Step One—Analyze the Text
The first step in analyzing § 362(c)(3)(A) according to Judge Waldron’s
approach is a plain meaning analysis to determine whether the language is
ambiguous.274 Here, the phrase in question is “with respect to the debtor.”275 In
this instance, the immediately preceding verb is “terminate.”276 Applying the
textualist canon noscitur a sociis, the verb “terminate” is limited by its
neighboring language “with respect to the debtor.”277 The doctrine expressio
unius est exclusio alterius advises that the inclusion of the phrase, “with
respect to the debtor,” implies an exclusion of that not mentioned.278 Here,
expression unius est exclusio alterius strongly suggests that the inclusion of the
reference to “the debtor” impliedly excludes the other main category protected
by the stay, the estate.279 A textual analysis of the phrase in isolation and its
immediately surrounding language reveals congressional intent to terminate
the stay as to “the debtor.”
However, it remains unclear what the term “the debtor” encompasses, and
whether “the debtor” is intended to distinguish the debtor from some other
person or whether “the debtor” somehow modifies the extent of termination as
to the filer.280 Sections 101 through 103 of the Bankruptcy Code do not offer
much guidance. Of the words “with respect to the debtor,” only “debtor” is
defined in § 101 of the Bankruptcy Code.281
Section 102 covers the rules of construction, and its subsection (2) states
that the phrase “claim against the debtor” is meant to encompass a claim
against property of the debtor.282 This may suggest congressional intent to
group the debtor and his property into the term “debtor,” meaning the phrase

274

Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 228.
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) (2006); Reswick, 446 B.R. at 365–66; Holcomb v. Hardeman (In re
Holcomb), 380 B.R. 813, 816 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008); Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 796–97; In re Jones, 339 B.R. 360,
363–65 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006).
276 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) (“the stay . . . shall terminate with respect to the debtor . . . .”).
277 See supra note 112.
278 See supra note 110.
279 See supra note 110.
280 Note that this is ultimately what the majority and minority disagree on. Compare Jumpp, 356 B.R. at
796–97 (determining that the phrase “‘with respect to the debtor’ limits termination of the stay to the debtor
and the debtor’s non-estate property”), with Reswick, 446 B.R. at 370 (determining that the phrase
distinguishes between the debtor and the non-debtor spouse in a joint filing).
281 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) (“The term ‘debtor’ means person or municipality concerning which a case under
this title has been commenced.”).
282 Id. § 102(2).
275
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“with respect to the debtor” clarifies that the stay terminates only as to the
debtor and the debtor’s property, but not as to the property of the estate.
Because the precise meaning of the phrase in isolation remains uncertain,
Judge Waldron’s approach directs that a contextual analysis be undertaken.283
Starting with § 362, Congress repeatedly distinguishes between the debtor, the
debtor’s property, and the property of the estate, as they relate to the automatic
stay.284 Section 362(a) includes eight subsections discussing various “entities”
protected by the stay, and it is this stay to which § 362(c)(3)(A) refers.285 Each
of these subsections in § 362(a) clarify an act or action that is stayed, and they
distinguish between the debtor, the debtor’s property, and the estate
property.286 The court in Jumpp explored these subsections, stating:
Section 362(a)(1) stays actions or proceedings ‘against the debtor,’
§ 362(a)(2) stays enforcement of a judgment ‘against the debtor or
against property of the estate;’ § 362(a)(3) stays ‘any act to obtain
possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate;’
§ 362(a)(4) stays ‘any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien
against property of the estate;” § 362(a)(5) stays ‘any act to create
perfect or enforce against property of the debtor any lien’ to the
extent it secures a prepetition claim; and § 362(a)(6) stays ‘ any act to
287
collect assess , or recover a claim against the debtor.

These distinctions further support the initial interpretation that the stay
terminates only as to the debtor and his property, as they show Congress
distinguished elsewhere the stay’s effect as to the three categories: the debtor,
the debtor’s property, and the property of the estate.288
Section 521(a)(6), another section added to the Bankruptcy Code with
BAPCPA in 2005, lends support to the existence of a modified stay that
terminates only with respect to the debtor and the debtor’s property under
§ 362(c)(3)(A).289 Section 521(a)(6) reads, in part, “[i]f the debtor fails to so
act within the 45-day period referred to in paragraph (6), the stay under section
362(a) is terminated with respect to the personal property of the estate or of the
debtor which is affected.”290 As evidenced by § 521(a)(6), Congress knew how
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290

Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 229.
Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 794.
11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) (“The stay under subsection (a) . . . .”).
Id. § 362(a).
Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 794; see In re Jones, 339 B.R. 360, 363–64 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006).
Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 794–95; see Jones, 339 B.R. at 364.
Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 795.
11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(6) (emphasis added).
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to convey that the stay terminated as to the estate and the debtor, and likely
would have done so in § 362(c)(3)(A), had it intended such an outcome.291
Finally, a comparison of the language in § 362(c)(3)(A) to the language of
§ 362(c)(4)(A)(i) confirms that the legislators intended a more limited scope of
the stay termination under § 362(c)(3)(A).292 “[U]se of a particular phrase in
one statute but not in another ‘merely highlights the fact that Congress knew
how to include such a limitation when it wanted to.’”293 Section
362(c)(4)(A)(i) refers to a debtor who has had two or more previous cases
dismissed within a year, and it states “the stay under subsection (a) shall not go
into effect upon the filing of the later case.”294 Alternatively, § 362(c)(3)(A)
references “the stay under subsection (a),” then qualifies its language
terminating the stay with the phrase “with respect to the debtor.”295 “Congress
could have removed the Stay in its entirety, as it did under § 362(c)(4), by
simply deleting the phrase ‘with respect to the debtor.’”296 The fact that
Congress did not use such expansive language in § 362(c)(3)(A) as it did in
§ 362(c)(4)(A)(i) shows that § 362(c)(3)(A)’s phrase “with respect to the
debtor” is intended to modify the extent to which the stay terminates.297
The contextual analysis supports that the original interpretation, which was
discerned from analyzing the phrase in isolation, is proper.298 The phrase “with
respect to the debtor” refers to the extent to which the automatic stay
terminates, clarifying that the property of the estate remains protected.299 The
stay terminates only as to the debtor and the debtor’s property.300 The
numerous references to these three categories throughout § 362, the lack of any
reference to the “property of the estate” as was present in § 521(a)(6), and the
provision’s limited language as compared to § 362(c)(4)(A)(i) all support the
majority interpretation—that the stay terminates as to the debtor and the
debtor’s property, but not as to the property of the estate.301
291

Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 795.
Jones, 339 B.R. at 364 (citing In re Paschal, 337 B.R. 274, 279–80 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006)).
293 Paschal, 337 B.R. at 279 (quoting Coleman v. Cmty. Trust Bank (In re Coleman), 426 F.3d 719, 725
(4th Cir. 2005)).
294 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
295 Id. § 362(c)(3)(A).
296 Id. § 362(c)(4); In re Brandon, 349 B.R. 130, 132 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006).
297 See Jones, 339 B.R. at 364 (citing Paschal, 337 B.R. at 279–80); Paschal, 337 B.R. at 279 (quoting
Coleman, 426 F.3d at 725); Brandon, 349 B.R. at 132.
298 See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
299 See supra note 294.
300 See supra note 294.
301 See discussion supra Part III.B.
292
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Nonetheless, the fact that § 362(c)(3) begins with the language “[i]f a
single or joint case is filed” has caused a significant number of courts to find
that the phrase “with respect to the debtor” clarifies as to whom the stay
terminates.302 These courts, representing the minority interpretation, argue that
the phrase is there to demonstrate that, in a joint filing of a married couple,
where only one spouse has had a previous case dismissed within the requisite
one-year period of § 362(c)(3), the stay only terminates as to the debtor’s
spouse, and it terminates in its entirety.303 Ambiguity means “more than one
principled meaning is permissible,”304 and therefore it is arguable that a
complete analysis should provide some consideration to this alternative
interpretation followed by a minority of courts.
However, interpretations that render apparent surplusage do not create
ambiguity.305 Rather, the existence of surplusage suggests a different
interpretation is correct.306 As discussed in Part III in the critique of Reswick,
the minority interpretation does render the phrase in question superfluous.
While the two cases are administered together for ease in a jointly filed case,
there are nonetheless two separate automatic stays protecting two separate
estates.307 The provision itself clarifies that it only applies to a debtor whose
single or joint case was “pending within the preceding 1-year period but was
dismissed.”308 Therefore, if the phrase “with respect to the debtor” is meant to
clarify that the stay terminates only as to the spouse with the prior dismissed
case, as the minority position purports, it offers no new meaning and is
superfluous. The alternative reading then does not create ambiguity and the
analysis may proceed with a plain meaning established.
B. Step Two—If the Statute is Ambiguous, Consult Other Available Canons of
Interpretation
Because the phrase “with respect to the debtor” is unambiguous, there is no
need to consult any additional canons of statutory interpretation, including

302

In re Daniel, 404 B.R. 318, 326 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009).
See, e.g., In re Curry, 362 B.R. 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007); Jumpp v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (In
re Jumpp), 344 B.R. 21 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006), vacated, 356 B.R. 789 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006); In re Jupiter,
344 B.R. 754 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006).
304 Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 229.
305 Id. (citing Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 541 (2004)).
306 Id. at 212.
307 In re Kosenka, 104 B.R. 40, 43 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
308 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) (2006).
303
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legislative history.309 Even if there were ambiguity present, Judge Waldron
directs courts to consider legislative history, if available.310 Given the
extremely scarce amount of legislative history surrounding BAPCPA, it would
be difficult to qualify legislative history as an available canon of statutory
interpretation.311 Attempting to decipher meaning from BAPCPA’s legislative
history could very well produce unnecessary ambiguity.
C. Step Three—Determine an Articulable Congressional Purpose
Having found a plain meaning of the text, Judge Waldron advises courts to
determine a congressional purpose that is consistent with that interpretation.312
If a court cannot find a consistent purpose, the court must reconsider its earlier
conclusions.313 While both the majority and minority approaches include some
policy considerations, neither expressly seeks an articulable congressional
purpose consistent with a predetermined statutory meaning. The majority
ensured their meaning did not lead to an “absurd result” given Congress’s
purpose,314 but Judge Waldron’s third step requires more; the plain meaning
should actually be consistent with an articulable congressional purpose.315
Here, the plain meaning analysis suggests that the text unambiguously
mandated a termination of the automatic stay as to the debtor and the debtor’s
property, but not as to the property of the estate. Therefore, the next step is to
determine an articulable congressional purpose consistent with this
interpretation.
The two overarching policy goals of the federal bankruptcy system, and the
automatic stay in particular, are to provide a fresh start to the debtor and equal
distribution to creditors.316 The automatic stay shields the debtor, preventing
all creditor collection, harassment, and foreclosure action, which provides the
debtor with valuable breathing space to attempt to come out of insolvency.317
In addition to the protections afforded the debtor, the stay is meant to benefit
309

Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 229–30.
Id. at 228.
311 Id. at 217 (“[T]here is no joint conference committee report, there is no Senate Judiciary Committee
Report and the House Judiciary Committee Report is often a mere repetition of the text of BAPCPA.”).
312 Id. at 228.
313 Id.
314 Jumpp v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (In re Jumpp), 356 B.R. 789, 796 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006) (citing
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)).
315 Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 228.
316 Rinard v. Positive Invs., Inc. (In re Rinard), 451 B.R. 12, 19 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011).
317 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6297; S. REP. No. 95-989,
at 49 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5840–41.
310
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the creditors by ensuring an orderly and equitable distribution of any property
of the estate.318 By protecting and preserving the estate, the stay ensures
maximum distribution for the creditors.319 The current system represents a
congressional response to the prior lack of organization surrounding
insolvency, which previously encouraged a creditor race to the courthouse to
collect on debts.320 These underlying goals continue to exist as the foundation
for the current federal bankruptcy system.
Section 362(c)(3)(A) partially removes one of these protections and reflects
an intent to deter abuse of the system by successive filings. However, Congress
did not express any intent to upset the foundational goals of bankruptcy, which
continue to be providing a fresh start for the debtor and equitable distribution
for creditors.321 The minority approach thwarts equitable distribution to the
creditors because thirty days after filing, the first creditor to get a judgment has
full access to property that might otherwise become part of the estate.322 “Such
property may be necessary to implement a debtor’s chapter 13 plan; or, in a
chapter 7 case, equity in the property above the creditor’s security interest
could be realized by the trustee to pay a dividend to creditors.”323 Interpreting
§ 362(c)(3)(A) as a limitation on the extent to which the automatic stay
terminates strikes a proper balance between the competing micro- and macrolevel policy goals. On a micro level, it deters abuse of the automatic stay; and
on the macro level, it advances fundamental bankruptcy policies by promoting
a fresh start for debtors and equitable distribution for creditors.324
Critics argue that the majority interpretation does not do enough to deter
successive filings because most of the debtor’s valuable property is property of
the estate, which remains protected.325 It is true that upon filing, much of the
debtor’s property becomes property of the new bankruptcy estate.326 However,
318

H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6297; S. REP No. 95-989, at 49, 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5835.
319 Heidt, supra note 22, at 74.
320 Rinard, 451 B.R. at 19.
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Jumpp v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (In re Jumpp), 356 B.R. 789, 796 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006).
325 In re Jupiter, 344 B.R. 754, 761–62 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006) (“If § 362(c)(3)(A) merely allowed creditors
to badger the Debtor with phone calls or obtain property of the debtor that is not property of the estate, then
this section would be of no value. A creditor’s threat to collect would be hollow if the stay remained as to the
property of the estate because § 1306 broadly incorporates nearly all of a debtor’s valuable pre- and postpetition property.”).
326 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006).
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there are exceptions, including the debtor’s exempt property. In bankruptcy, a
debtor may seek to exempt certain amounts of various kinds of property.327
Once the deadline for filing objections to the claimed exemptions has passed,
the exempt property is no longer part of the estate.328 Therefore, even though
the stay remains in place as to the property of the estate, the debtor’s exempt
property is at risk. The exposure of this exempt property to creditors, under the
majority interpretation, adds immense pressure to the debtor to perform
according to his chapter 13 plan. In chapter 7, the stay serves as an important
protection for creditors by increasing the property to be distributed.
Therefore, there is an articulable congressional purpose consistent with the
majority interpretation. Terminating the stay as to the debtor and the debtor’s
property does offer creditor action that deters a debtor from successive filings
merely to take advantage of the automatic stay. However, it does so without
demolishing the macro level policy considerations of the federal bankruptcy
system.
D. Step 4—Doctrinal Examination
The fourth and final step to Judge Waldron’s approach is to apply four
doctrines as a last check on the statutory meaning.329 These doctrines include
scrivener’s error, absurdity, contrary to the drafters’ intention, and
constitutional avoidance.330 Nothing in the language of § 362(c)(3)(A) suggests
a clerical error resulting from the drafters’ oversight, so scrivener’s error
presents no issues with the analysis. The absurdity doctrine, meant to deal with
incomprehensible text, also does not present any issues here. The language
reads clearly and has been found to comply with an articulable congressional
purpose. Likewise, applying the doctrine of contrary to the drafters’ intention
presents no obstacle as this interpretation is not contrary to the purpose of
deterring abuse. Rather, it represents a balanced approach of furthering that
goal with the overarching goals of bankruptcy. Finally, no constitutional issues
are raised, so the constitutional avoidance doctrine weighs in favor of the
purported interpretation.

327
328
329
330

Id. § 522.
Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 641–42 (1992).
Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 228.
Id.
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E. Summary
The application of Judge Waldron’s approach leads to the adoption of the
majority interpretation of § 362(c)(3)(A). A plain meaning analysis of the
language, determined according to traditional canons of statutory interpretation
and BAPCPA’s own interpretive sections, presents an initial finding that
§ 362(c)(3)(A) mandates termination of the automatic stay as to the debtor and
his property. That finding is bolstered by a contextual analysis of the provision,
focusing both on the surrounding language of § 362 and other provisions
throughout the Bankruptcy Code that distinguish between various types of the
stay. Given the clear plain meaning and the limited availability of legislative
history surrounding BAPCPA, legislative history need not and should not be
relied upon to inform the analysis. An articulable congressional purpose exists,
as this meaning properly balances the federal bankruptcy system’s macro level
policy goals with the micro level policy goal of § 362(c)(3)(A). Finally, the
doctrinal examination does not present any problems. Section 362(c)(3)(A)
should be interpreted as requiring termination of the stay as to the debtor and
the debtor’s property, but not as to the property of the estate, thirty days after
filing, if the debtor has had a prior case dismissed within the preceding year.
The analysis taken by the court in Jumpp was much closer to this
Comment’s independent application of Judge Waldron’s approach to
§ 362(c)(3)(A) in its emphasis on the text of § 362(c)(3)(A),331 its finding that
the phrase has an unambiguous plain meaning,332 and its brief discussion of
policy concerns.333 Also like this Comment’s application of Judge Waldron’s
approach, the court in Jumpp did not rely on legislative history,334 noting the
scarce amount of available legislative history surrounding § 362(c)(3)(A).335
Alternatively, the court in Reswick dedicated a sizeable portion of its opinion
to the legislative history of § 362(c)(3)(A) and the history of abuse by
331 Jumpp v. Chase Home Finance, L.L.C. (In re Jumpp), 356 B.R. 789, 793 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006) (“In
our search for ambiguity, we consider ‘the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used,
and the broader context of the statute as a whole . . . Viewed in isolation, the language itself is unambiguous.”
(emphasis added)).
332 Id.
333 Id. at 796–97 (“A partial termination also protects creditors by protecting estate property. It is not
absurd that Congress may have sought to balance the interests of individual secured creditors with the interests
of creditors as a whole . . . .”) (internal citations omitted).
334 Id. at 796 (“In the face of an unambiguous statute, the Panel need not consider the statute’s legislative
history.”).
335 Id. at 796 n.4 (citing Bankers Trust Co. v. Gillcrese (In re Gillcrese), 346 B.R. 373, 376 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 2006)); Jumpp, 344 B.R. 21, 26 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006) (describing the legislative history as “sparse”),
vacated, 356 B.R. 789 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006); Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 227.
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successive filings to support its adoption of the minority view.336 The court’s
analysis in Jumpp more closely resembled Judge Waldron’s approach and led
to the more well-reasoned opinion that § 362(c)(3)(A)’s phrase “with respect to
the debtor” is meant to clarify that thirty days after filing, a debtor who has had
a prior case dismissed within the preceding year will lose the protection of the
automatic stay as to himself and his property only. The estate remains
protected.
Judge Waldron’s approach provides for a thorough analysis of
§ 362(c)(3)(A) and is fit to serve as the framework of statutory interpretation
for BAPCPA. The proposed approach draws from both competing
foundational theories of statutory interpretation, properly placing the greatest
emphasis on the text which has actually survived the Constitutionally-required
obstacles to becoming the law. It mandates an examination of the phrase in
isolation before moving to a contextual analysis, which limits courts’ abilities
to place improper emphasis on certain words or phrases unintended to affect a
phrase’s overall meaning. It also limits the influence of legislative history,
which is proper given the limited amount that is available surrounding
BAPCPA.
CONCLUSION
Through the application of Judge Waldron’s thorough and clearly
articulated framework of interpreting BAPCPA, it becomes evident that the
majority interpretation is the better reading of § 362(c)(3)(A). The majority
adheres more closely to the plain meaning of the language used by Congress
and the context in which it appears, and more properly balances the macro
level policy concerns of the bankruptcy system with the micro level policy
concerns of § 362(c)(3)(A). Over-reliance on legislative history, especially
when interpreting BAPCPA provisions, may be detrimental given its
scarcity.337 Courts should interpret § 362(c)(3)(A) to mandate termination of
the automatic stay, as to the debtor and the debtor’s property only, thirty days
after the debtor has filed, if that debtor has had a previous case dismissed in the
preceding year.

336

Reswick v. Reswick (In re Reswick), 446 B.R. 362, 370–73 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011).
Jumpp, 356 B.R. at 796 n.4 (citing Bankers Trust Co. v. Gillcrese (In re Gillcrese), 346 B.R. 373, 376
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006)); Jumpp, 344 B.R. at 26 (describing the legislative history as “sparse”), vacated, 356
B.R. 789 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006); Waldron & Berman, supra note 8, at 227.
337

LEHNERT GALLEYSPROOFS1

2012]

12/19/2012 11:35 AM

TERMINATION OF THE STAY FOR SUCCESSIVE FILERS

287

The split of authority regarding the proper interpretation of § 362(c)(3)(A)
demonstrates the dire need for a clearly articulated, Supreme Court–endorsed
framework of statutory interpretation. The various “rules” of statutory
construction from the case law do not provide sufficiently clear direction,
given the scarce amount of legislative history and the inartful drafting of the
Code. Judge Waldron’s approach to interpreting BAPCPA proves far better
than the current “system” of statutory interpretation, consisting of numerous
conflicting Supreme Court rules and resulting in inconsistency and
unpredictability. Through an application of Judge Waldron’s approach to
statutory interpretation, a complete framework is produced through which
BAPCPA may be properly analyzed.
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